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Abstract
We analyze a two-stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In
the rst stage rms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose
the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium the rms focus more
on the high-valuation customers. When the capacities in the rst stage are endogenous,
the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in
one-stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity-weighted average price increases
with the level of price discrimination as opposed to established results in the literature
for one-stage games.
1 Introduction
While the theory of price discrimination is well understood in the monopoly set-
ting, this literature is relatively new for imperfectly competitive markets. There
are two broad approaches to modelling imperfect competition: price competition
and quantity competition. The di¤erentiated products framework is dominant in
the price competition setting and the homogeneous goods framework is dominant
in the quantity competition setting.1 The common approach in the literature on
1See Armstrong [1], Renault and Anderson [14], and Stole [19] for surveys about price dis-
crimination.
1
price discrimination in oligopoly follows the price competition approach. Boren-
stein [3], Chen [4], Holmes [8],2 and Thisse and Vives [21] exemplify some of the
studies that use the price competition approach.
In the present paper we concentrate on the homogeneous goods framework
where the valuations of customers are represented by a function of some charac-
teristic(s) of the customers. On the basis of those characteristics rms segment
the customers in various segments. We analyze price discrimination as a two-
stage game. In the rst stage the rms compete on quantities that they put in
the market, and in the second stage they simultaneously decide what fraction of
the quantity they sell to di¤erent groups of buyers.3 In other words, in the second
stage rms optimally segment their customers by allocating the available quanti-
ties. Hence, in the second stage the rms can be asymmetric if their rst stage
choices are not the same. Firms may have many instruments at their disposal for
discriminating between buyers. Where our model can be applied, the examples
abound. A prominent example of an instrument used for price discrimination
is the airline industry, where the valuations of buyers can be represented by a
function of the time when they buy tickets. Business travellers, whose plans are
generally last moment, are willing to pay more compared to tourists, whose plans
are almost always exible. Thus di¤erent segments of buyers can be grouped
according to the day they want to buy a particular airline seat. For example,
higher-end segments may consist of business travellers. In order to x ideas we
stick to the airline industry.
The paper closest to ours that considers price discrimination in quantity com-
petition is Hazledine [6]. For the linear demand case, Hazledine [6] analyzes price
discrimination in the Cournot framework, where rms decide on quantities to
sell in various segments. In contrast to Hazledine [6], who models price discrim-
ination in one stage, we model price discrimination in two stages, as described
earlier. In both Hazledine [6] and our model, the number of segments is exoge-
nous. Hazledine [6] nds that the average price in the market is independent of
the level of price discrimination and thus concludes that the standard single-price
models prediction is not misleading in terms of the average price. Bakó and
Kálecz-Simon [2] and Kutlu [11] conrm the robustness of invariance of average
2Holmes [8] builds upon the monopoly model of Robinson [15].
3In another framework, Kreps and Scheinkman [9] propose a two-stage game where in the rst
stage the rms set the capacities and in the second stage the price is determined in a Bertrand-
like competition given the capacities. It turns out that the capacities correspond to the Cournot
output levels and the rms set Cournot prices in the second stage.
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price to the level of price discrimination. For the linear demand case, Kutlu [10]
incorporates price discrimination in the Stackelberg [18] model and nds that
the leader does not price discriminate. All these models consider that the rms
segment customers into di¤erent segments according to certain characteristics de-
termining their valuation. Varian [23] provides an earlier example of the similar
approach for price discrimination in monopoly. In quantity setting price discrim-
ination for a monopoly Varian [23] nds that increase in output is necessary for
price discrimination to be welfare increasing. Formby and Millner [5] consider the
relationship between price discrimination and competition.4 More precisely, they
compare the social welfare of price discriminating monopoly (in Hazledines [6]
framework) and that of single price Cournot competition. They nd that when
the demand curve5 is concave (convex, linear), price discrimination with n prices
produces greater (lesser, equal) output and welfare than a Cournot oligopoly with
n competitors.
We consider a general demand function (not restricted to linear) for the ho-
mogeneous goods in a duopoly setting. We start with the second stage of the
game where, for a given quantity from the rst stage, we provide an algorithm to
nd the shares to be allocated in di¤erent segments. One of the ndings of our
paper is that in the second stage both rms are active in the higher-end segments
and their allocation of quantities are the same for each higher-end segment until
the smaller rm runs out its rst-stage quantity. Unless the demand function
is too convex,the shares of the higher-end segments are greater than those of
the lower-end ones. Then, we analyze the rst stage of the competition where
rms choose quantities. We provide an explicit solution for linear demand as an
illustration. We show rmsbehavior in the benchmark Cournot case. The to-
tal quantities sold by the Cournot oligopolist and total welfare increase with the
level of price discrimination. We nd that the deadweight loss always exists, no
matter what the level of price discrimination is. This contrasts with the one-stage
price discrimination game (Hazledine [6]) and monopoly. In both the one-stage
game and monopoly, deadweight loss vanishes as the number of price segments
grows. Therefore, our model serves as an example of the fact that competition
may not always be welfare increasing. Indeed, in this case, allowing a monopolist
to operate and redistributing an optimal tax collected from the monopolist could
make everyone better o¤ compared to the two-stage price discriminating duopoly.
In particular, an antitrust authority valuing total welfare may have higher incen-
4Formby and Millner [5] call it Stackelberg price discrimination.
5Whenever we mention demand curvewe mean inverse demand curve.
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tives to approve mergers for duopolists in the airline industry compared to other
industries where price discrimination is not practiced. That is, the required e¢ -
ciency gain for welfare in the price discrimination framework is potentially lower.6
Moreover, in contrast to the established results in the literature that we discussed
above, we nd that the average price is increasing with the level of price discrim-
ination. Hence, the standard single-price modelsprediction about the average
price can potentially be misleading when rms rst choose capacities and then
allocate these capacities in a second stage. Therefore, caution should be taken
when using the average price for estimation in empirical models.
In section 2, we introduce our model and present results for the share allocation
for a general demand function. In section 3, we provide the solution of the share
allocation game for the linear demand case. We also provide an extension of
the Cournot game and compare our results with that of Hazledine [6]. Section 5
concludes, and we gather the major proofs in section 6 (Appendix).
2 The Model and Share Allocations
In this section we consider an oligopolistic competition model in which rms
choose the sizes of segments optimally.7 We provide a solution algorithm for a
general demand function which we use when deriving our results for the linear
demand case in the following sections. We rule out the arbitrage possibilities,
including intra-personal arbitrage, where a high-valuation customer can act like a
low-valuation customer. Hence, in this sense, our model is a version of third-degree
price discrimination (group pricing). The price in a segment is determined through
the quantity choices of rms and depends on how much is sold in other segments.
For example, consider a market with two segments based on the reservation prices,
which depend on the number of days before the ight where there is a breakdown
in prices. Airlines can choose quantities assigned to each segment indirectly by
choosing a threshold day so that the customers arriving later than this day are
assigned to segment 1 and the remaining customers are assigned to segment 2. By
changing the threshold day, the airline can implicitly decrease the size of segment
6Note, however, that such a redistribution can be di¢ cult to implement in practice. Also,
merger decisions would likely be based on a variety of factors, including but not limited to rms
price discrimination behaviors. Here, we point out that the presence of price discrimination may
not necessarily lead to welfare-decreasing outcomes.
7Note that the number of segments is exogenous. By optimal segmentation we mean the
distribution of quantities in various segments rather than the number of segments, which is
exogenous in our model.
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1. Hence, whenever such adjustments are di¢ cult or impossible to implement,
the model with exogenous segmentation discussed above seems more sensible. For
example, if the segmentation is based on gender, the size of segments would be
taken as given. On the other hand, if the airlines are exible in such adjustments,
then our model may be more sensible. It seems that price discrimination based
on advance purchase segmentation as described above allows the airlines to be
exible in adjusting the size of segments and thus our model ts this framework
well.
Now we describe our theoretical model which is based on Hazledine [6]. As-
sume for simplicity that there are only two rms in the market that sell a homoge-
neous good: Firm A and Firm B. We set the marginal costs equal to zero. Each
consumer buys at most one unit of the good and they buy the good only if the
price does not exceed their valuation of the good. The rms know the valuations
of consumers and can prevent resale of the good. They divide the consumers into
K segments according to their reservation prices. The total capacities of the rms
are exogenously given by QA and QB where QA  QB. Here we assume that the
capacities are not too big so that disposing is not optimal. For example, we can
consider QA and QB as quantities produced in the rst stage of a two-stage game
where production takes place in the rst stage and the decision of quantity alloca-
tion in various segments is made in the second stage. Given these capacities rms
compete on the shares that they assign to each segment. Hence, rms choose
sA = (s
1
A; s
2
A; :::; s
K 1
A ; s
K
A ) and sB = (s
1
B; s
2
B; :::; s
K 1
B ; s
K
B ) with
PK
i=1 s
i
A = 1 andPK
i=1 s
i
B = 1 where q
i
A = QAs
i
A and q
i
B = QBs
i
B. Going back to our example of
airline seats o¤ered for a specic route, from now on we can think of the product
an airline seat and a seller an airline. Total number of seats of airlines is
exogenously given. The airlines simultaneously decide how many of these seats
they sell to which customers. The price of the good for the kth segment is given
by:
P k = P (Qk) (1)
where qiA and q
i
B are the quantities sold in segment i by A and B; Q
k Pki=1(qiA+
qiB) is the total quantity sold in all segments from 1 to k; and P is a twice
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly decreasing demand function that represents
consumersvaluations.8 Moreover, for a given combination of QA and QB, we
assume that the revenue functions (which are also the prot functions in our case,
8The number of segments refers to the number of groups in which the product is sold. It is
likely that there will be some leftover consumers that are not served.
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given zero costs) of rms A and B are strictly concave in sA and sB, respectively.9
The optimization problem of rm A is given by:10
maxA = QA
KP
i=1
P isiA (2)
s.t. siA  0 and
KP
i=1
siA = 1
Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2, which we present below, contribute to
the solution of optimization problem (2) above. In Lemma 1 below we show that
both rms are active in the top segment and that the segments where a rm
sells are consecutive. Also, the bigger rm is active in all K segments. Hence,
there may be segments where the smaller rm is not active. We identify those
segments where the smaller rm is not active through an index denoted by {^. The
segments with index numbers greater than {^ have only the bigger rm active in
them. In top segment(s), except the last segment where the smaller rm is active
(i.e., segment {^  1), rms match their quantities. By top segments we mean the
segments with lower indices which represent the higher valuation customers and
{^ is the last segment (from the top) in which the smaller rm is not active. Even
though there are K segments, we are using the index up to K + 1 in order to
include the case where QA = QB or they are so close that A is active in all the
segments. Hence, {^ = K + 1 means that siA > 0 in all segments, i = 1; 2; :::;K.
Lemma 1
1. Assume that QA  QB and for some segment i 2 f1; 2; :::;Kg we have
siA = 0, then s
i+1
A = 0.
2. Firm Bs share in jth segment, sjB > 0 for j 2 f1; 2; :::;Kg.
3. Let {^ 2 f3; :::;K;K + 1g be such that s{^A = s{^+1A ::: = sK+1A = 0 and sjA > 0
for j < {^. Then for j < {^  1 we have qjA = qjB.
Now we provide a proposition that describes the behavior of the rms in all
segments for a general demand function. Even though we do not have a closed-
form solution, this proposition gives a recursive way to get an explicit solution for
a specic demand function up to nding {^. After the proposition we describe an
9The demand curve not being too convex is one of the requirements. Notice for example, in
the monopoly case with no price discrimination we require the inverse demand function to be
less convex than P (Q) = 1
Q
. See Novshek [13], Roberts and Sonnenschein [16], Szidarowsky
and Yakowitz [20], Tirole [22], and Vives [24] for conditions on existence in setups without price
discrimination.
10Note that the optimization problem for rm B is exactly the same.
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algorithm to nd such a solution. Later in this paper, in Corollaries 1, 2, and 3,
we give an explicit solution for the linear demand case as an example.
Proposition 1 Assume that QA  QB. Let {^ 2 f2; 3; :::;K;K + 1g be such that
s{^A = s
{^+1
A ::: = s
K
A = s
K+1
A = 0 and s
j
A > 0 for j < {^. The optimal shares for A
and B are described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Given the value of {^, the algorithm provides the quantity allocations
for each segment. Recall that A may not be active for some of the segments.
Hence, the algorithm requires a case analysis. There are three cases to consider.
Case I considers the segments where both A and B are fully active so that A
matches the quantity of B. Case II considers the segment where both A and B
are active but where the capacity of A is not large enough to match the quantity
of B for that particular segment. Finally, Case III considers the segments where
only B is active. Based on these cases, the solution algorithm is given as follows.
From the cases below, we can recursively solve sjB in terms of s
1
B for j  K.
Moreover, since we have
PK
k=1 s
k
B = 1, we can solve for s
1
B. Once we have the
solution for sBs we can solve for sAs as follows. From Case I, we can recursively
solve sjA in terms of s
1
A for j < {^  1. Since we have s{^ 1A = 1 
P{^ 2
k=1 s
k
A, we can
solve for s{^ 1A in terms of s
1
A as well. In order to solve for s
1
A, we use Lemma 1.
That is, given s1B the solution for s
1
A is given by:
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s1A =
QB
QA
s1B.
Note that depending on the value of {^ some of the cases disappear. Hence,
the sequence of shares might start from Case II or Case III rather than Case I.
Whenever {^ > 3 the solution algorithm starts from Case I; if {^ = 3, the solution
algorithm starts from Case II; and if {^ = 2, the solution algorithm starts from
Case III.
Case I (j < {^  2):
P (2QA
jX
k=1
skA)  P (2QA
j+1X
k=1
skA) =  
@P j
@Q
QAs
j
A (3)
P (2QB
jX
k=1
skB)  P (2QB
j+1X
k=1
skB) =  
@P j
@Q
QBs
j
B (4)
11Note that this statement holds for the {^ > 2 case. The case where {^ = 2 is trivial as s1A = 1.
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Case II (j = {^  2):
P (2QA
{^ 2X
k=1
skA)  P (QA(1 +
{^ 2X
k=1
skA) +QBs
{^ 1
B ) =  
@P {^ 2
@Q
QAs
{^ 2
A (5)
P (2QB
{^ 2X
k=1
skB)  P (QA +QB
{^ 1X
k=1
skB) =  
@P {^ 2
@Q
QBs
{^ 2
B (6)
Case III (j > {^  2):
sjA = 0 for j > {^  1 (7)
s{^ 1A = 1 
{^ 2X
k=1
skA (8)
P (QA +QB
jX
k=1
skB)  P (QA +QB
j+1X
k=1
skB) =  
@P j
@Q
QBs
j
B for j < K (9)
sKB = 1 
K 1X
k=1
skB. (10)
In Proposition 1 we described the conditions for equilibrium shares for a gen-
eral demand function. One particular implication of this proposition is that unless
the demand function is too convex, the shares of the higher-end segments are
greater than those of the lower-end ones. In the following proposition, we give
more conditions that will help identify {^. The rst statement of the proposition
along with Lemma 1 shows that there is no segment where the smaller rm puts
more quantity than the bigger rm.
Proposition 2 The shares of rms in the last segment where A is active, i.e.,
the segment {^  1, must satisfy:
QAs
{^ 1
A  QBs{^ 1B for 2  {^  K + 1 (11)
P (2QA
{^ 2X
k=1
skA)  P (2QA
{^ 1X
k=1
skA)   
@P {^ 2
@Q
QAs
{^ 2
A for 3  {^  K + 1 (12)
At this point we would like to mention that the shares that are decided by the
above results are invariant to any a¢ ne transformation of the demand function.
In other words, two demand functions P and ~P where ~P =  + P would lead
to the same solution for the shares. In what follows we solve the linear demand
8
case. For a general demand function the equilibrium can be calculated in a similar
fashion.
3 The Linear Demand Case
In this section we present our main results for the linear demand case. We consider
the linear demand given by P j = a Qj . Using the propositions stated above we
nd the closed-form solution for the equilibrium, which turns out to be unique.12
In line with the previous section, in the equilibrium both rms are active in the
top segment(s) and the bigger rm is active in all K segments. The rms match
the quantities in the top segments until segment {^   2. Also, in each segment
until segment {^ 2, the rms put exactly half of the quantity that they put in the
previous segment. Starting from segment {^  1 the bigger rm splits the quantity
equally in all segments. Recall that this behavior of the bigger rm is like that of
a monopolist in those segments.
Corollary 1 Let {^ 2 f2; :::;K;K + 1g be such that s{^A = s{^+1A ::: = sKA = 0 and
sjA > 0 for all j < {^. Moreover, assume that the demand is linear, given by:
P j = a Qj. (13)
The optimal shares for A and B are described as follows:
Case 1 ({^ = 2):
s1A = 1 and s
j
A = 0 if j > 1
sjB =
1
K
for j = 1; 2; :::;K
Case 2 ({^  3):
sjA =
8><>:
1
2j 1 s
1
A if j < {^  1
1  (2  1
2{^ 3 )s
1
A if j = {^  1
0 if j > {^  1
sjB =
(
1
2j 1 s
1
B if j < {^  1
2s1B   QAQB if j  {^  1.
12Note that any linear inverse demand function will lead to exactly the same solution as we
have mentioned earlier.
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The following corollary states the behavior of rm A in the last segment(s).
In segment {^   1 it just puts the remainder, which is no more than half of what
he puts in segment {^  2.
Corollary 2 For any {^ = 3; :::;K + 1 we have:
2s{^ 1A  s{^ 2A . (14)
The following corollary, together with Corollary 1, characterizes the solution
for general {^  2 . For a given QA=QB ratio, {^ is unique and so is the equilibrium.
When the gap between capacities of rms increases (i.e., QA=QB decreases), the
number of segments where the rm with smaller capacity is active (i.e., {^   1)
would decrease. The rm with smaller capacity would concentrate on the high-
end segments. The reason is that the rm with smaller capacity would have a
higher shadow cost compared to the other rm, which makes it relatively harder
for it to stay in the low-end segments.
Corollary 3 The shares for the rst segments are given as follows:
s1A =
8><>:
QB
QA
1+
QA
QB
K{^
H{^
2{^ 3+2K{^
if {^ > 2
1 if {^ = 2
s1B =
8><>:
1+
QA
QB
K{^
H{^
2{^ 3+2K{^
if {^ > 2
1=K if {^ = 2
where the unique {^ is characterized by:
1 + 2H
{^
K{^ + 2H{^
 QA
QB
>
H
{^
K{^ +H{^
H{^ = 2
{^ 2   1
K{^ = K   {^+ 2.
Now that we have identied the unique equilibrium of the share allocation
game with exogenously given capacities, we explore the equilibria in the games
where the capacities themselves are endogenous.
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4 Generalization of Cournot As an Example
In this section we provide a generalization of the benchmark Cournot competition
model and compare it with Hazledines [6] price discrimination model. For both
settings we assume that there are two rms in the market and the marginal costs
are equal to zero. The rms divide the consumers into K segments according
to their reservation prices. The demand is assumed to be linear and given by
Equation (13). We set a = 1. In Hazledines [6] framework the rms are playing
a one-stage game in which they simultaneously choose the quantities that they
assign to each segment. By contrast, the second stage of our two-stage framework
corresponds to the share allocation game introduced in the previous section.
A crucial di¤erence in solving the two models is that the prot function of
each rm in the rst stage of our two-stage model is a piecewise function. Each
piece corresponds to a di¤erent {^, which in turn is determined by the ratio of
rst stage quantities, QAQB . A di¢ culty in nding the best response functions
of the rms is that the calculations must take into account the various cases
corresponding to various {^s. However, for nding the symmetric equilibrium we
only need to consider the piece corresponding to {^ = K+1. For the two rms and
two prices (segments) case, we nd that the equilibrium quantities of each rm is
9=23, in contrast with Hazledines [6] corresponding quantity, 3=7. The average
price13 and prots respectively are 9=23 and 81=529, as opposed to 1=3 and 1=7 in
Hazledines [6] framework. For K = 1; 2; :::; 15 we plot the prots, quantities, and
average prices for comparison. Figures 1-4 compare the symmetric equilibrium
outcomes of our two-stage game, the equilibrium outcomes of Hazledine [6], and
the equilibrium outcomes of price discriminating monopoly. From now on, we
denote our model by KK,Hazledines [6] by H,and monopoly by M.
13By average price we mean output-weighted average price.
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Figure 4: Total welfare
In general, the prots of A and B are given by:
A = (1  f{^Q{^)QA + g{^Q2{^
B = QB   h{^Q2{^ +K{^Q{^QA  
(K{^   1)K{^
2
Q2A
12
where
H{^ = 2
{^ 2   1
K{^ = K   {^+ 2
Q{^ = QB +K{^QA
1 + 2H
{^
K{^ + 2H{^
 QA
QB
>
H
{^
K{^ +H{^
x{^ =
1
2{^
f{^ =
2(1  2x{^)
1  4x{^ +K{^
g{^ =
2
3
8x2{^   6x{^ + 1
(1  4x{^ +K{^)2
h{^ =
8(8x2{^   6x{^ + 1) + 12K{^(1  2x{^) + 3K{^(K{^   1)
6(1  4x{^ +K{^)2 .
The portion of the best response capacity of rm A and B corresponding the
{^ = K + 1 is:
QA =
3
 
2K   1   2K+1   1QB
5 (2K)  4
QB =
3
 
2K   1   2K+1   1QA
5 (2K)  4 .
Therefore, in the symmetric equilibrium the prot, quantity, and average price
are given by:14
A =
 
3
 
2K   1
7 (2K)  5
!2
QA =
3
 
2K   1
7 (2K)  5
A
QA
=
3
 
2K   1
7 (2K)  5 .
14We dont provide the relevant values for B as they would be the same.
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Corresponding equilibrium values for Hazledine [6] are given by:
HA =
2K   1
6 (2K)  3
QHA =
2K   1
2K+1   1
HA
QHA
=
1
3
.
In the limit when K ! 1 the equilibrium values become A = 949 and QA =
A
QA
= 37 . Hence, in the presence of competition even if the rms can charge
many prices there is deadweight loss. This contrasts with both Hazledine [6] and
the price discriminating monopoly case where for large K there is no deadweight
loss. A monopolist can set quantities without being distracted by the e¤ects of
competition. However, in the price discrimination framework, depending on the
setting (Hazledine [6] versus capacity choice price discrimination game (KK)),
competition can have a negative e¤ect on total welfare. Hazledine [7] argues that
Air New Zealand and Qantas use K = 12. If other airlines use a similar number
of segments and play KK, then an antitrust authority valuing the total welfare
might have higher incentives to approve mergers in the airline industry compared
to industries without price discrimination. Hence, the required e¢ ciency gain for
such a merger is potentially lower. If the antitrust authority ignores this, then this
might lead to an over-rejection of mergers. KK dominates its one-stage counter-
part in terms of prots. Conditional on the second stage outcomes, the rms can
coordinate their capacities (total quantities) better compared with Hazledines
[6] counterpart. This results in lower quantities and higher prots for the rms.
One implication of this is that rms can potentially benet from the presence
of capacity constraints. In Hazledines [6] setting the average price is invariant
to the number of segments, K. This invariance result is shown to be robust
to other settings. For example, Bakó and Kálecz-Simon [2] show the invariance
result for the asymmetric cost case and Kutlu [11] shows the invariance result for
a functional form which is nesting constant elasticity demand function. However,
in our capacity choice framework this invariance result breaks down.
5 Conclusion
We studied the price discrimination and imperfect competition in a homogeneous
goods framework. We modelled this as a two-stage game as opposed to the existing
14
works in this particular framework. One of our main ndings is that deadweight
loss exists for all levels of price discrimination. Hence, if the number of price
segments is large, the monopoly may be socially preferred over a duopoly. This
contrasts with the price discriminating monopolist and one-stage price discrimi-
nating duopoly. Therefore, a welfarist social planner should consider protecting
monopolies or approving mergers when evidence of two stage price discrimination
is found. Another nding is that the output-weighted average price will increase as
the level of price discrimination increases. This contrasts with the earlier ndings
that suggest that output-weighted average price is invariant to the level of price
discrimination and this invariance is robust. Thus it has been suggested that the
average price can be used for estimation purposes without worrying about price
discrimination. Our result changes this perception and indicates that caution
must be taken if there is evidence of price discrimination.
A generalization of our model to the many rms case can also be used in
merger analysis in the price discrimination framework where merging is a way
to expand the capacities of rms. Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds [17] show that,
in general, without a form of cost reduction the mergers are not protable in
the Cournot framework. One way to deal with this problem is to allow capacity
expansions ex-post the merger. Of course, in practice the merger analysis is more
complicated than this. A better model for analyzing the e¤ects of mergers would
also incorporate other factors, such as the dynamic factors and e¢ ciency.15
6 Appendix: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem (2) is given by:
LA = A + A(
KP
j=1
sjA   1) (15)
Let ~A =
A
QA
.16 For any i = 1; 2; :::;K the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given
15See Kutlu and Sickles [12] for a dynamic model considering the e¢ ciencies of rms when
measuring their market powers.
16Note that we are solving the problem of an active rm. Therefore it is assumed that QA > 0.
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by:17
P i +Ai + ~A  0
(P i +Ai + ~A)s
k
A = 0
KP
k=1
skA = 1
siA  0
whereAi =
PK
k=i
@Pk
@Q
@Qk
@skA
skA. In what follows we assume thatAi =
PK
k=i
@Pk
@Q
@Qk
@skA
skA
and Bi =
PK
k=i
@Pk
@Q
@Qk
@skB
skB for the sake of notational simplicity.
Now, we prove the statement 1 of Lemma 1. Let us assume, to get a con-
tradiction, that siA = 0 and s
i+1
A > 0 for some i 2 f1; 2; :::;K   1g. Then we
have:
P i   Ai   ~A =  Ai+1   ~A = P i+1
Here the inequality comes from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions; the rst equality
follows from our assumption that siA = 0; the second equality follows from the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions given that si+1A > 0. Hence, P
i  P i+1. But by the
monotonicity of the demand P i  P i+1, implying that P i = P i+1. This in turn
implies that there are K   1 segments, which is a contradiction.
Now, we prove the statement 2 of Lemma 1. Let {^ 2 f2; :::;K;K +1g be such
that s{^A = s
{^+1
A ::: = s
K+1
A = 0 and s
j
A > 0 for all j < {^. In order to prove the
lemma, we consider two cases.
Case 1 (^{  K): If {^  K, then sKB > 0. Otherwise, there will not be K
segments which is a contradiction.
Case 2 (^{ = K+1): The arguments from statement 1 of Lemma 1 holds for B
as well. Therefore, it is clear that s1B > 0. Otherwise, s
2
B = ::: = s
K
B = 0, implying
that QB = 0, which is a contradiction. Lets assume that s
j
B > 0 for all j < t. We
will show that stB > 0. Assume this is not the case, i.e., s
t
B = s
t+1
B = ::: = s
K
B = 0.
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we know that:
P j +Aj + ~A = 0 (16)
P j +Bj + ~B = 0 (17)
P t +At + ~A = 0 (18)
P t +Bt + ~B  0 (19)
17For notational simplicity we represent @P (Q
j)
@Q
by @P
j
@Q
.
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Subtracting the equality (18) from the inequality (19) gives:
Bt  At + ~B   ~A  0
From (16) and (17) we know that:
~B   ~A = Aj  Bj
Therefore, we have:
Bt  At +Aj  Bj  0 (20)
Bj  Aj +Aj 1  Bj 1 = 0 (21)
From equations (20) and (21), we have:
 QB @P
t 1
@Q
st 1B +QA
@P t 1
@Q
st 1A  0
 QB @P
t 2
@Q
st 2B +QA
@P t 2
@Q
st 2A = 0
...
 QB @P
1
@Q
s1B +QA
@P 1
@Q
s1A = 0
From monotonicity of demand, we have @P
j
@Q < 0. Therefore:
QBs
t 1
B  QAst 1A
Summing over segments 1; 2; :::; t  1 we get:
QB
t 1X
k=1
skB  QA
t 1X
k=1
skA
or
QB  QA
t 1X
k=1
skA < QA
The strict inequality follows from the fact that A is active in all segments until
segment K. This is a contradiction.
Finally, we prove statement 3 of Lemma 1. Note that by statement 2 of
Lemma 1 we have sjB > 0 for j 2 f1; 2; :::;Kg. Hence, for all j < {^ we have
P j =  Aj   ~A =  Bj   ~B. Hence, P j   P j+1 = qjA = qjB.
17
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Note that for j < {^  1 we have:
P (Qj)  P (Qj+1) = ( Aj   ~A)  ( Aj+1   ~A)
=  @P
j
@Q
QAs
j
A
Also, by statement 2 of Lemma 1, using the similar steps as above, we get:
P (Qj)  P (Qj+1) =  @P
j
@Q
QBs
j
B
For Case I, we have j < {^   2. Therefore Qj = QA
Pj
k=1 s
k
A + QB
Pj
k=1 s
k
B.
Since j < {^ 2, by Lemma 1 we haveQAsjA = QBsjB. Hence, Qj = 2QA
Pj
k=1 s
k
A =
2QB
Pj
k=1 s
k
B and Q
j+1 = 2QA
Pj+1
k=1 s
k
A = 2QB
Pj+1
k=1 s
k
B.
For Case II, we have j = {^  2. Therefore Qj = 2QA
P{^ 2
k=1 s
k
A = 2QB
P{^ 2
k=1 s
k
B
and Qj+1 = QA(1 +
P{^ 2
k=1 s
k
A) +QBs
{^ 1
B = QA +QB
P{^ 1
k=1 s
k
B.
For Case III, notice that QA is exhausted after segment {^   1. For segment
{^  1, s{^ 1A is the residual share for A. By statement 2 of Lemma 1, B is active in
segments {^; {^+ 1; :::;K, i.e., s{^B; s
{^+1
B ; :::; s
K
B > 0. Therefore from the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for all j = {^; {^+ 1; :::;K   1 we have:
P j +Bj + ~B = 0
P j+1 +Bj+1 + ~B = 0
Hence, we have:
P j   P j+1 =  @P
j
@Q
QBs
j
B
or
P (QB
jX
k=1
skB +QA)  P (QB
j+1X
k=1
skB +QA) =  
@P j
@Q
QBs
j
B

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6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
First, we prove the inequality (11). From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we know
that:
P {^ +A{^ + ~A  0
P {^ +B{^ + ~B = 0
P {^ 1 +A{^ 1 + ~A = 0
P {^ 1 +B{^ 1 + ~B = 0
Then we have:
P {^   P {^ 1 +A{^  A{^ 1  0
P {^   P {^ 1 +B{^  B{^ 1 = 0.
Hence:
A{^  A{^ 1  B{^  B{^ 1
or
 @P
{^ 1
@Q
QAs
{^ 1
A   
@P {^ 1
@Q
QBs
{^ 1
B .
By monotonicity of the demand we know that @P
{^ 1
@Q < 0. Therefore we have:
QAs
{^ 1
A  QBs{^ 1B
Now, we prove the inequality (12). From Proposition 1 we know that:
P (2QA
{^ 2X
k=1
skA)  P (QA(1 +
{^ 2X
k=1
skA) +QBs
{^ 1
B ) =  
@P {^ 2
@Q
QAs
{^ 2
A
or
P (2QA
{^ 2X
k=1
skA)  P (2QA
{^ 2X
k=1
skA +QAs
{^ 1
A +QBs
{^ 1
B ) =  
@P {^ 2
@Q
QAs
{^ 2
A .
Since QAs
{^ 1
A  QBs{^ 1B by monotonicity of the demand we have:
P (2QA
{^ 2X
k=1
skA +QAs
{^ 1
A +QBs
{^ 1
B )  P (2QA
{^ 1X
k=1
skA).
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Therefore:
P (2QA
{^ 2X
k=1
skA)  P (2QA
{^ 1X
k=1
skA)   
@P {^ 2
@Q
QAs
{^ 2
A .

6.4 Proof of Corollary 1
For Case 1, note that by denition of {^ and statement 2 of Lemma 1 we have
s1A = 1. From Equation (9) and Equation (10) we have:
(a QA  QB
jX
k=1
skB)  (a QA  QB
j+1X
k=1
skB) = QBs
j
B for j < K
sKB = 1 
K 1X
k=1
skB .
Hence:
sj+1B = s
j
B for j < K
sKB = 1 
K 1X
k=1
skB.
This implies that:
sjB =
1
K
.
For Case 2, we only prove the {^ > 3 case. The {^ = 3 is case is similar. For
j < {^  1, by Equation (3) and Equation (4), for any j < {^  2 we have:
(a  2QA
jX
k=1
skA)  (a  2QA
j+1X
k=1
skA) = QAs
j
A
(a  2QB
jX
k=1
skB)  (a  2QB
j+1X
k=1
skB) = QBs
j
B
Hence:
2sj+1A = s
j
A
2sj+1B = s
j
B
20
Hence, for any j < {^  1 we have:
sjA =
1
2j 1
s1A (22)
sjB =
1
2j 1
s1B.
By Equation (22) and the fact that s{^ 1A = 1  
P{^ 2
k=1 s
k
A we have s
{^ 1
A =
1  (2  1
2{^ 3 )s
1
A. Now, we nd s
{^ 1
B . From Equation (6) we know that:
(a  2QB
{^ 2X
k=1
skB)  (a QA  QB
{^ 1X
k=1
skB) = QBs
{^ 2
B
sKB = 1 
K 1X
k=1
skB .
Hence:
( 2QB
{^ 2X
k=1
skB)  (a QA  QB
{^ 1X
k=1
skB) = QBs
{^ 2
B .
Hence, we have:
QA +QBs
{^ 1
B = QBs
{^ 2
B +QB
{^ 2X
k=1
skB
QA +QBs
{^ 1
B = QBs
{^ 3
B +QB
{^ 3X
k=1
skB
...
QA +QBs
{^ 1
B = 2QBs
1
B.
This implies that:
s{^ 1B = 2s
1
B  
QA
QB
. (23)
The case j > {^  1 directly follows from equations (7), (9), and (23).

6.5 Proof of Corollary 2
By Proposition 2 we know that:
(a  2QA
{^ 2X
k=1
skA)  (a  2QA
{^ 1X
k=1
skA)  QAs{^ 2A .
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Hence:
2s{^ 1A  s{^ 2A .

6.6 Proof of Corollary 3
First, assume that {^ > 2. Using Case II in Proposition 1 we have:
QAs
{^ 1
A +QBs
{^ 1
B = QAs
{^ 2
A . (24)
Also from Corollary 2 we have:
s{^ 1A 
1
2
s{^ 2A .
Assume that the quantities that rm A puts in the segments {^   1 and {^   2
are y and x, respectively. Then, from equation (24), Corollary 1, and Corollary 2
we get the following system, which will characterize {^:
y + x+ 2x+ 4x+ :::+ 2{^ 3x = QA
(K   {^+ 2)(x  y) + x+ 2x+ 4x+ :::+ 2{^ 3x = QB
0  y  x
2
QA  QB.
Letting H{^ = 2{^ 2   1 and K{^ = K   {^+ 2 we have:
y +H{^x = QA (25)
 K{^y + (K{^ +H{^)x = QB
0 < y  x
2
QA  QB.
Solving for x and y we have:
x =
K{^QA +QB
K{^H{^ +K{^ +H{^
y =
K{^QA +H{^(QA  QB)
K{^H{^ +K{^ +H{^
22
From the inequality (25) we have:
1 + 2H
{^
K{^ + 2H{^
 QA
QB
>
H
{^
K{^ +H{^
. (26)
Now, assume that {^ = 2. Then, by Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 we have:
QA  1
K
QB.
Note that H2 = 0 and K{^ = K. Hence, the system (26) holds for {^ = 2
as well. Let 
{^
=
1+2H
{^
K{^+2H{^
and 
{^
=
H
{^
K{^+H{^
. Now, we show the uniqueness of
the equilibrium. Note that it is enough to show that f({^; {^]g{^ partitions (0; 1].
This simply means that for any given QAQB value, there will be one and only one
corresponding set ({^; {^]. This set identies the {^ that gives the equilibrium.
First, note that @{^@{^  0 and @{^@{^  0. Moreover, we know that K+1 = 1 and
2 = 0. Hence, if {^ = {^ 1 for any {^ = 3; :::;K, then f({^; {^]g{^ partitions [0; 1].
We want to show that:
{^ 1 =
1 + 2H
{^ 1
K{^ 1 + 2H{^ 1
=
H
{^
K{^ +H{^
= {^
or
(1 + 2H
{^ 1)(K{^ +H{^)  (K{^ 1 + 2H{^ 1)H{^ = 0
K{^ + 2K{^H{^ 1 +H{^ + 2H{^H{^ 1  K{^ 1H{^   2H{^H{^ 1 = 0
K{^ + 2K{^H{^ 1 +H{^  K{^ 1H{^ = 0
K{^ + (H{^   1)K{^ +H{^  K{^ 1H{^ = 0
H
{^
(K{^ + 1) K{^ 1H{^ = 0
H
{^
(K   {^+ 2 + 1)  (K   (^{  1) + 2)H
{^
= 0
0 = 0
We conclude that for any given QAQB there exists a unique equilibrium for the
quantity choices of A and B. The equilibrium is determined by the conditions
from Corollary 1 and inequality system (26). Finally, the shares for the rst
23
segments are given as follows:
s1A =
QB
QA
1 + QAQBK{^
H{^
2{^ 3 + 2K{^
(27)
s1B =
1 + QAQBK{^
H{^
2{^ 3 + 2K{^
.

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